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Abstract 
A two-stage procedure is employed to evaluate the determinants of merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in 
Australian credit unions over the period 1992/93 to 1994/95. In the first stage, data envelopment analysis is used 
to calculate technical and scale efficiency indices for a sample of credit unions. The second stage uses a 
multinomial logit model to relate credit union efficiency scores, along with other managerial, regulatory and 
financial factors, to the probability of credit unions acquiring or being acquired by another credit union. The 
results indicate that asset size and quality, management ability, earnings and liquidity are a significant influence 
on the level of M&A. One primary influence on credit union acquisitions would appear to be the perceived 
compatibility in associational bond and membership. 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, Credit unions, Data envelopment analysis, Technical and scale efficiency.  
For most of their history, credit unions have operated within a well-defined, institution-
specific, regulatory sub-sector of the Australian financial system. However, in the period 
following deregulation Australian credit unions were forced to adapt to a newly competitive 
environment. The most discernible response has been a dramatic increase in merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity. In point of fact, competitive pressures for consolidation are not 
confined to Australia and are relatively commonplace for financial mutuals and other small 
deposit-taking institutions throughout the world. In the United States restrictions on 
expansion through branches and acquisitions across state lines have been progressively 
dismantled through the weakening of the Glass-Stegall Act and the recent passage of the 
Riegle-Neal Banking Act (Cyree et al., 2000). These and other competitive pressures have 
seen a dramatic increase in interstate and intrastate acquisitions among credit unions and 
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S&Ls (Shaffer, 1993; Grabowski et al., 1995) and a renewed emphasis on the examination of 
financial and productive performance in financial mutuals (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; 
Grabowski et al., 1993; Fried et al., 1996). In the United Kingdom building societies are the 
major financial mutuals and are likewise the subject of increasing empirical attention in this 
regard [see, for example, Piesse and Townsend (1995), Drake and Weyman-Jones (1996) and 
Thompson (1997)]. The close correspondence of the role and competitive environment of 
financial mutuals in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, amongst others, 
provides a compelling rationale for the examination of M&A activity in alternative 
institutional milieus.     
However, examination of existing empirical evidence on the managerial, regulatory and 
financial determinants of financial institution mergers suggests that the motives for mergers in 
cooperative deposit-taking institutions vary substantially from those found in, say, 
commercial banks. One aspect of this process is the major behavioural differences between 
the private ownership claims found in mutual organisations and their joint stock equivalents. 
Thompson (1997, p. 38), for example, has argued, “this is curious since, at least in the context 
of an Anglo-American type of corporate governance system, it is the threat of a hostile take-
over which represents the ultimate disciplinary sanction for managers who depart from 
shareholder value maximisation. By contrast, most countries’ mutual sectors are so 
constituted that hostile acquisition is impossible”. Accordingly, there is the suggestion that 
structural change in cooperative financial services is essentially restricted to ‘friendly’ 
mergers, and that there is a large degree of acquiescence by regulatory authorities in this 
matter (Thompson, 1997).  
Likewise, decision rules in cooperative enterprises primarily rest on democratic principles, 
rather than ownership concentration. Traditionally, this has been used to suggest that the 
appropriate behavioural assumption in cooperative institutions is the maximisation of member 
services rather than profits. However it has also been suggested by Garden and Ralston 
(1999), amongst others, that the process of deregulation, and the increased competition from 
the entry of new market participants (e.g. mortgage specialists, insurance companies, etc.), 
has meant that management and regulators have increasingly shaped the objectives of credit 
unions towards a more commercial orientation. In this manner, any pre-existing ideological 
imperatives found in credit unions have been constrained by the need to function in a highly 
competitive financial market. 
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Accordingly, any analysis of the motives for merger activity in cooperative deposit-taking 
institutions is likely to involve the complex interaction of a large number of factors. 
Furthermore, it is likely that these motives have changed substantially during the recent 
program of financial reform. On one hand, the behavioural objectives of cooperative deposit-
taking institutions, including credit unions, are relatively complex, and should take account of 
the overriding objective of maximising member services. On the other, the process of 
deregulation in the Australian financial services industry has emphasised the role of 
management and regulators, with a corresponding emphasis on improving efficiency and 
financial viability. A careful analysis of these divergent forces should therefore add to our 
knowledge about the factors determining the pattern of structural change in Australia 
financial services, and provide at least some idea of the effectiveness of recent 
microeconomic reform, especially in regard to some of the smaller deposit-taking institutions.  
In this paper an attempt is made to examine the determinants of M&A activity in 
Australian credit unions. The paper itself is divided into four main sections. The first section 
focuses on the characteristics of credit unions in Australia, especially those that are likely to 
impact upon decisions concerning merger and acquisition activity. The second section deals 
with the specification of those variables posited to influence the recent pattern of M&A. The 
third section presents the empirical results of the analysis. The paper ends with some brief 
concluding remarks in the final section. 
1.   Merger and acquisition in the cooperative financial sector 
Credit unions are generally presented as maintaining an objective and culture unlike that of 
any other Australian financial institution. Similarly, and despite the recent program of 
microeconomic reform, credit unions and other cooperative societies operating in Australia 
receive differing treatment under the regulatory system to all other financial institutions, 
including commercial banks. These impact upon the process of merger and acquisition in the 
credit union industry, and correspondingly on empirical efforts to model this process. Several 
salient points are noted.  
The first key consideration is that credit unions in Australia operate on a cooperative basis, 
principally by borrowing from and providing finance to their members. And in general, these 
institutions have maintained the key principle of ‘mutuality’: implying ‘one member, one 
vote’, regardless of the size of the individual member’s deposits or loans (Garden and 
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Ralston, 1999). When combined with the fact that a credit union cannot acquire shares in 
another, the suggestion is that a merger of credit unions must be agreed to by both parties; a 
hostile take-over of a sound credit union therefore being difficult, if not impossible, to 
achieve (Brown et al., 1999). Likewise, in Australia liquidation of credit unions has been 
extremely rare, and it is widely understood that the exit of credit union in financial distress is 
likely to occur through merger rather than liquidation. In most instances, and well before any 
question of insolvency, regulators have evaluated possible partners for merger and facilitated 
the exit of an unsound credit union.  
The second key consideration is that a credit union’s overriding objective is generally 
accepted to be maximisation of member benefits rather than profit-maximisation. However, 
there is evidence that the objectives of credit unions have increasingly been shaped by 
management towards a more conventional profit-orientation. The most obvious reason is that 
decisions by management with respect to member services are made in the context of a highly 
competitive financial sector. This has meant that long-standing practices in the commercial 
banking sector have been recently adopted in cooperative deposit-taking institutions. One 
example is the widespread adoption of a ‘user-pays’ system of charges with respect to deposit 
accounts. Another reason for the erosion of the member-services orientation is associated with 
the strengthening asset growth rate for credit unions. There is the suggestion that the rapid 
growth of credit unions has heightened the power of management at the expense of member 
control. For example, O’Brien (1993) has argued that commercial interests in credit unions 
have progressively dominated any earlier philosophical or social commitments.  
The third key consideration is that the regulatory environment within which Australian 
cooperative deposit-taking institutions operate has also reoriented credit unions towards 
profit-maximisation. Since the introduction of the Australian Financial Institutions Act 1992, 
credit unions have been subject to a risk-weighted capital adequacy requirement of eight 
percent, equivalent to that imposed on banks. They are also required to hold seven percent of 
their liabilities as prime liquid assets, and a further six percent as liquid funds under an 
operational liquidity requirement. The argument here is that since capital is usually held in the 
form of retained earnings, the only way credit unions can build up sufficient reserves to allow 
asset growth is through the accumulation of operating surpluses. Davis (1994, p. 44) has 
argued that this process will necessarily focus management attention upon financial targets 
not necessarily consistent with the credit union’s goals as a cooperative. More importantly, it 
has been suggested that the stringent portfolio constraints on liquidity, capital and lending in 
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credit unions (including provisions that more than sixty percent of total assets are loans to 
members), highlight merger as a means of increasing capital base and improving efficiency.  
The final key consideration is that in spite of the erosion of the traditional objectives of 
credit unions, there is still an emphasis on the common bond or affinity that defines 
membership of individual credit unions. For example, a common bond technically restricts 
membership of individual credit unions in Australia to three categories; namely, industrial 
(employee) groups; community (geographic) groups; and parish (religious) groups. This 
common bond is argued to be an important reason for the industry’s success to date, but it is 
also a potential limitation on future growth. On one hand, it encourages member loyalty to the 
institution (which in some instances may override the desire for the cheapest alternative form 
of banking), while on the other it may restrict the extent of growth by an excessively 
restricted potential customer base (Garden and Ralston, 1997). Though the process of merger 
among Australian credit unions has seen a considerable weakening of these bonds, it also 
suggests that more immediate concerns in finding a merger partner may be consideration of 
consistency of purpose and geographic location as a means of preventing erosion of member 
loyalty.  
Accordingly, three possible characterisations of the merger process are likely to be found 
when modelling mergers in Australian cooperative deposit-taking institutions. The first is that 
the merger process reflects the reorientation of credit unions services towards profit-
maximisation, and is therefore predominately driven by managerial objectives. Thompson 
(1997, p. 39) has argued that this mechanism is comparable to that provided by the market for 
corporate control in the joint stock sector, which “works to eliminate underperforming 
mutuals and transfer their assets to other societies within the sector”. The second 
characterisation is that the merger process reflects direct intervention by regulators to promote 
efficiency and stability within the financial system. Moreover, regulatory constraints placed 
upon credit unions may highlight mergers as a means of increasing capital base and operative 
efficiency in the increasingly competitive financial services industry. The final 
characterisation is that notwithstanding the commercial and regulatory imperative discussed 
earlier, the notion of a bond of association may exert a strong influence on merger activity 
through both commercial and ideological concerns.  
2.   Empirical methodology 
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The data used in this study consists of annual observations of all Australian credit unions. 
All data is sourced from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and its 
immediate predecessor the Australian Financial Institutions Commission (AFIC). The time 
period selected is the three financial years 1992/93 to 1994/95. The total number of credit 
unions in operation and the number of merging and acquiring credit unions vary over the 
sample period. Of the 323 credit unions in operation in 1992/93, 19 institutions were 
‘acquired’ in 1993/94 with 15 credit unions ‘acquiring’ one other credit union, and 2 credit 
unions acquiring more than one credit union in the same year. Of the 304 credit unions 
remaining in operation in 1993/93, 16 credit unions subsequently merged with 14 acquiring 
credit unions in 1994/95. Of these, two credit unions were acquired by the same acquiring 
credit union and one credit union merged with a building society. Finally, 9 credit unions 
were acquired by 9 credit unions in 1995/96 from a total 1994/95 population of 290 credit 
unions. A more extensive set of time-series data would, of course, be more valuable. 
Unfortunately, a national framework for the prudential supervision of State-based non-bank 
deposit-taking institutions (along with the requisite database) was only established with the 
creation of AFIC in July 1992.  
A pooled time-series, cross-sectional multinomial logit model with an assumption of 
common effects is used to analyse the factors that influence M&A activity in cooperative 
deposit-taking institutions. In any given year, a credit union has three possible (unordered) 
outcomes: (i) be acquired by another credit union; (ii) acquire another credit union; or (iii) 
maintain the status quo. Hence the following model is estimated:   
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where the probability of the occurrence of the dependent variable, j (indicating each credit 
union’s M&A status), is thought to depend on a set of financial, managerial and regulatory 
factors, x, and β is a set of parameters to be estimated. Of course, several alternative models 
could be equally well used. For example, Cyree et al. (2000) use a two-stage logistic 
regression approach to estimate the probability of a particular growth strategy, contingent on 
the choice of the bank to grow. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables contained in the explanatory vector x for each of the 
three financial years are presented in Table 1. These variables represent various aspects of 
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firm performance and are structured in accordance with a CAMEL (capital structure, asset 
quality, management ability, earnings and liquidity) regulatory classification system. The 
variables used to represent various aspects of credit union performance are comparable to 
those employed by Thompson (1997) in an analysis of mergers in UK building societies.  
The first variable in Table 1 relates to the role of capital structure in determining the 
likelihood of merger or acquisition in credit unions. Capital is of particular concern in 
depository financial institutions of this type because of their low net worth and highly 
leveraged nature, which creates a potential for failure should there be a sudden withdrawal of 
deposits. The measure of capital within each institution is defined as the ratio of reserves 
(including permanent share capital, asset revaluations and retained earnings) to total assets 
(CAP). All other things being equal, an acquired (acquiring) credit union should have a 
relatively lower (higher) level of capital (Berger et al., 1993; 1999). A negative coefficient is 
hypothesised for acquired credit unions and a positive coefficient for acquiring credit unions.  
The second variable relates to the asset management activities of each credit union. Asset 
quality measures are concerned with assessing the default or credit risk of the loan portfolio, 
as well as the allocation of the asset portfolio between liquid investments and loans. One 
measure used is the ratio of provision for doubtful debts expense to total loans (PRD). The ex 
ante sign on this coefficient is thought to be positive (negative) for acquired (acquiring) credit 
unions, reflecting in part the extent of asset diversification and the impact of asset risk on 
merger activity.  
The next two variables included in the regression relate to management ability vis-à-vis 
technical efficiency and the scale of operations in relation to scale efficiency. The method 
used to measure efficiency in these credit unions is based upon data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), a mathematical programming approach to frontier estimation pioneered in Charnes et 
al. (1978) and extended in Banker et al., (1984). Suitable introductions to DEA may be found 
in Coelli et al. (1997) and Cooper et al. (2000). Measuring efficiency in this manner is 
consistent with both the recent literature associated with the efficiency analysis of deposit-
taking institutions in general, including Elyasiani et al., (1994), Favero and Papi (1995), 
Miller and Noulas (1996), and with a large number of past empirical approaches to efficiency 
measurement in non-bank financial institutions, notably Piesse and Townsend (1995), Drake 
and Weyman-Jones (1996) and Worthington (1998; 1999; 2000). Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) provide a comprehensive survey of the various approaches to efficiency measurement 
in financial institutions.  
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In brief, the advantages and disadvantages of the DEA approach to efficiency measurement 
are as follows. To start with, one obvious problem with DEA is that in contrast to the 
econometric approaches to efficiency measurement it is both nonparametric and 
nonstochastic. Thus, no accommodation is made for the types of bias resulting from 
environmental heterogeneity, external shocks, measurement error, and omitted variables. 
Consequently, the entire deviation from the frontier is assessed as being the result of 
inefficiency. This may lead to either an under or over-statement of the level of inefficiency.  
However, there a number of benefits implicit in the mathematical programming approach 
that makes it attractive on a theoretical level. First, given its nonparametric basis it is 
relatively easy to alter the specification of inputs and outputs and thereby the formulation of 
the production correspondence relating inputs to outputs. Thus, in cases where the usual 
axioms of production activity breakdown (i.e. profit maximisation) then the programming 
approach may offer useful insights into the efficiency of these types of industries. This is 
especially the case with mutual financial institutions. Second, when using the alternative 
econometric approach considerable structure is imposed upon the data from both stringent 
parametric form and distributional assumptions regarding both inefficiency and, in the case of 
stochastic frontiers, statistical noise. These considerations, and the natural emphasis of DEA 
on the notion of ‘best-practice’ performance, make it an attractive method of measuring 
efficiency in credit unions.  
The computational procedure used to implement the DEA approach to efficiency 
measurement is presented briefly as follows. Consider N credit unions each producing M 
different outputs using K different inputs in a particular time period. The K×N input matrix, X, 
and the M×N output matrix, Y, represent the data of all N credit unions, while for the 
individual credit union these are represented by the vectors xi and yi. The efficiency of each 
credit union can be determined from the solution to the following linear program: 
0
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         (2) 
where yi is the vector of outputs produced by the ith credit union, xi is the vector of inputs 
used by the ith credit union, i runs from 1 to N, and j equals 1, 2, ..., N, θ is a scalar and λ is a 
N×1 vector of constants. The value of θ will be the technical efficiency score for a particular 
credit union. It will satisfy θ ≤ 1, with a value of 1 indicating a point on the frontier, and 
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hence a technically efficient credit union. The value of θ ≤ 1 identifies the amount of any 
inefficiency that may be present.  
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Table 1  
Explanatory variable descriptive statistics 
 Variable M&A status 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
    Mean Standard deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
CAP All credit unions 0.0615 0.0429 0.0565 0.0442 0.0587 0.0540 
  Acquired credit unions 0.0825 0.0554 0.0680 0.0332 0.0594 0.0449 
  Acquiring credit unions 0.0477 0.0322 0.0402 0.0297 0.0605 0.0351 
PRD All credit unions 0.0260 0.0268 0.0251 0.0319 0.0208 0.0200 
  Acquired credit unions 0.0490 0.0476 0.0517 0.0720 0.0232 0.0125 
  Acquiring credit unions 0.0176 0.0115 0.0192 0.0070 0.0126 0.0150 
PTE All credit unions 0.9888 0.0333 0.9853 0.0378 0.9817 0.0481 
 Acquired credit unions 0.9784 0.0693 0.9966 0.0119 1.0000 0.0000 
 Acquiring credit unions 0.9814 0.0355 0.9852 0.0301 0.9906 0.0280 
NIL All credit unions 0.0589 0.1796 0.0571 0.1844 0.0616 0.0218 
  Acquired credit unions 0.0819 0.0492 0.0765 0.0424 0.0734 0.0204 
  Acquiring credit unions 0.0727 0.0175 0.0719 0.0161 0.0532 0.0105 
TEX All credit unions 0.9965 0.5134 0.9957 0.5247 0.9979 0.4445 
  Acquired credit unions 1.1000 0.1866 1.1264 0.4025 0.9847 0.0829 
  Acquiring credit unions 0.9518 0.0970 0.9027 0.0658 0.9575 0.0735 
LIQ All credit unions 0.2415 0.1404 0.2477 0.1325 0.2063 0.1107 
  Acquired credit unions 0.3992 0.1353 0.2417 0.1061 0.1791 0.0639 
  Acquiring credit unions 0.1802 0.0715 0.1830 0.0558 0.1551 0.0304 
AST All credit unions 10.4538 11.0369 10.6185 11.1609 10.7834 11.3136 
  Acquired credit unions 7.4244 8.0004 8.2735 8.8197 10.1294 10.4045 
C
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   Acquiring credit unions 11.3181 11.4249 11.0517 10.9343 11.4606 11.1543 
  Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage 
IRS All credit unions 203 63 187 61 169 58 
 Acquired credit unions 16 84 10 62 8 89 
 Acquiring credit unions 6 35 9 64 14 22 
COM All credit unions 117 36 110 36 104 36 
 Acquired credit unions 7 37 6 38 2 22 
 Acquiring credit unions 9 53 9 64 0 0 
IND All credit unions 192 59 183 60 178 61 
 Acquired credit unions 10 53 16 100 7 78 
 Acquiring credit unions 8 47 0 0 9 100 
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SME All mergers 11 58 10 63 6 67 
Notes: CAP is the ratio of capital reserves to total assets; PRD is the ratio of the provision for doubtful debts to total 
loans; PTE is an index measure of pure technical efficiency; NIL is the ratio of net interest income to total loans; 
TEX is the ratio of total expenses to total income; LIQ is the ratio of prime liquid assets to total assets; AST is the 
log of total assets; IRS is one if the credit union has increasing returns-to-scale and zero otherwise; COM is one if 
the credit union is community-based and zero otherwise; IND is one if the credit is industrial-based and zero 
otherwise; SME is one if both the acquired and acquiring credit union are either community or industrial-based.   
In this program, emphasis is placed on the equiproportionate reduction of inputs. An input 
orientation is adopted since it is assumed that capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are 
likely to restrict the level of output in any time period. Hence, a suitable behavioural objective 
for these institutions would be that of input minimisation, rather than output maximisation. 
The input measures thus provided can then detect failures to minimise inputs resulting from 
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discretionary power and incomplete monitoring, and thereby provide an indication of possible 
gains from exploiting technical efficiencies. Other efficiency studies that employ an input-
orientated approach include Worthington’s (1998) analysis of Australian credit unions and 
Drake and Weyman-Jones’ (1996) study of UK building societies. In addition, profit 
maximisation is not assumed. This follows the majority of empirical work in the area of 
financial mutual efficiency measurement [see, for instance, Piesse and Townsend (1995), 
Fried et al. (1996), Thompson (1997), Worthington (1998; 1999)]. In defence, Fried et al. 
(1993, p. 253) argue, “since credit unions are owned and operated by members, the objectives 
of credit unions can be thought of as maximising services provided to members. This 
immediately suggests that profit maximisation is not an appropriate objective”. Nonetheless, 
an emerging literature has begun to see credit unions as ‘conditional’ profit maximisers where 
profits are maximised conditional on prices in order to, amongst other things, subsidise loan 
and deposit rates. For example, Westley and Shaffer (1999) adopted a profit function 
approach for a study of Latin American credit unions and used a survey to gain the requisite 
data on wages and loan/deposit rates. Unfortunately, information of this type for Australian 
credit unions is not available.   
The model specified in (2) also has an assumption of constant returns-to-scale and is only 
appropriate where all credit unions are operating at an optimal scale. Where this assumption 
does not hold, scale effects will confound the measures of technical efficiency. Generally, 
regulatory, geographical and institutional constraints imply that most credit unions are not 
operating at an optimal scale. Following Banker et al. (1984) the linear programming problem 
can be modified to account for variable returns-to-scale (that is, measures of technical efficiency 
without scale efficiency effects) by adding the convexity constraint N1′λ = 1 to (2). The 
measure of technical efficiency obtained without the convexity constraint (that is, under an 
assumption of constant returns-to-scale) is referred to as overall technical efficiency. The 
measure obtained including the convexity constraint (that is, assuming variable returns-to-scale) 
is known as pure technical efficiency (PTE). Dividing overall technical efficiency by pure 
technical efficiency yields a measure of scale efficiency. A single variable is subsequently 
defined for the multinomial logit analysis in (1). This is an index measure of pure technical 
efficiency (PTE). All other things being equal, an acquired (acquiring) credit union is 
expected to be relatively less (more) pure technically efficient than an acquiring (acquired) 
credit union. Put differently, managerial ability is thought to be higher in acquiring credit 
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unions than acquired credit unions. A negative (positive) coefficient is expected for acquired 
(acquiring) credit unions. 
Table 2  
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) input and output descriptive statistics 
Variable M&A status 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
PHY All credit unions 824.42 2088.68 887.67 2112.55 997.01 2270.81
  Acquired credit unions 12.88 23.17 90.70 321.69 614.08 945.45
  Acquiring credit unions 1685.08 1715.84 2168.52 3609.81 712.12 796.17
AC All credit unions 13550.45 29095.58 16148.56 32030.61 17378.31 34476.35
  Acquired credit unions 685.00 1032.84 1408.10 2142.07 9289.81 13879.94
  Acquiring credit unions 31640.26 40380.96 24059.83 20736.58 29457.93 20813.49
NW All credit unions 2111.49 7114.59 2300.77 8789.68 2170.96 8689.85
  Acquired credit unions 145.75 304.40 314.57 1039.10 959.14 2178.23
  Acquiring credit unions 4160.01 6717.32 1459.46 3068.33 3868.41 3717.92
FT All credit unions 14881.87 27589.93 17403.78 31099.00 22486.82 39835.27
  Acquired credit unions 640.67 1602.78 1768.19 3494.32 11017.66 12999.39
  Acquiring credit unions 36454.67 40324.14 29383.77 29789.63 49380.80 40150.59
IX All credit unions 1631.51 2966.24 1539.83 2701.62 1995.67 3573.69
  Acquired credit unions 84.98 148.81 154.09 263.20 891.91 1075.39
  Acquiring credit unions 4007.18 4611.76 2400.22 2142.32 3872.23 2886.92
NIX All credit unions 1556.77 2756.29 1768.46 3041.34 2014.57 3292.60
  Acquired credit unions 89.60 156.28 223.76 424.88 1378.09 1897.30
  Acquiring credit unions 4192.03 4859.64 2811.69 2301.24 4244.06 3584.54
PL All credit unions 13539.78 24446.06 14435.03 25280.52 16354.47 28015.65
  Acquired credit unions 801.81 1457.94 1911.65 2688.43 8451.97 9708.99
  Acquiring credit unions 34779.06 41596.11 24124.69 19657.94 36355.60 35224.80
CL All credit unions 560.02 1933.90 908.03 2487.67 1490.82 3938.48
  Acquired credit unions 128.39 517.17 39.45 157.78 439.71 930.90
  Acquiring credit unions 840.97 1767.85 535.85 800.22 1433.98 2281.25
RL All credit unions 10718.41 22150.98 14072.17 27622.94 18247.08 36190.70
  Acquired credit unions 171.18 744.11 893.13 2532.16 10358.97 16445.03
  Acquiring credit unions 23951.37 25454.27 21538.69 24757.60 36082.95 27647.70
INV All credit unions 6863.27 13295.93 8266.89 14969.96 8059.45 13957.16
  Acquired credit unions 503.51 620.53 856.46 1318.93 4159.70 5232.37
  Acquiring credit unions 15747.97 17389.71 11075.25 9016.69 16116.54 12195.32
IY All credit unions 3295.55 5801.45 3402.46 5795.12 4011.00 6777.10
  Acquired credit unions 167.77 302.38 347.13 586.49 2207.67 2754.01
  Acquiring credit unions 8355.67 9919.52 5533.52 4804.37 8211.82 6539.91
NIY All credit unions 258.56 646.35 325.99 787.21 392.39 912.50
  Acquired credit unions 6.85 14.03 34.14 75.90 193.58 302.82
  Acquiring credit unions 584.48 604.25 431.38 601.36 633.14 675.95
Notes: PHY is physical capital; AC is at-call deposits; NW is notice-of-withdrawal deposits; FT is fixed term 
deposits; IX is interest expenses; NIX is non-interest expenses; PL is personal loans; CL is commercial loans; 
RL is residential loans; INV is investments; IY is interest income; NIY is non-interest income.   
One shortcoming of the measure of scale efficiency defined is that its value does not 
indicate whether the credit union is operating in an area of increasing or decreasing returns-
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to-scale. This may be determined by imposing non-increasing returns-to-scale in (2) by 
replacing the N1′λ=1 restraint with N1′λ≤1. If the technical efficiency score under an 
assumption of non-increasing returns-to-scale is equal to the score obtained under variable 
returns-to-scale then decreasing returns to scale apply. If they are unequal then increasing 
returns-to-scale exist for that credit union. The fourth variable defined is a dummy variable 
indicating the presence of increasing returns-to-scale (IRS). In the short-term, scale may be 
beyond the control of managers, however it is expected that credit unions operating at a 
smaller than optimal scale may be acquired.  
The inputs and outputs employed in the DEA approach are detailed in Table 2 (in 
thousands of Australian dollars), and follow the intermediation approach to modelling 
financial institution behaviour. In this approach credit unions combine physical capital (PHY), 
at call deposits (AC), notice-of-withdrawal deposits (NW) and fixed term deposits (FT), along 
with interest (IX) and non-interest expenses (NIX), to produce personal loans (PL), 
commercial loans (CL) residential loans (RL), investments (INV), interest (IY) and non-
interest income (NIY). In terms of specific studies, the approach is most consistent with the 
value-added intermediation approach used by Berg et al. (1993), Favero and Papi (1995) and 
Fried et al. (1996).  
The simple descriptive statistics in Table 2 already highlight some interesting differences 
between acquiring and acquired credit unions and credit unions as a whole. Turning first to 
acquired credit unions, in each of the three years one-tailed t-tests for equality of means 
(assuming unequal variances) reject the null hypothesis of equality at the .05 level for each of 
the twelve variables. These tests then indicate that the average dollar value of physical capital, 
deposits and loans (across various categories), investments and interest and non-interest 
expenses and income in acquired credit unions is significantly less than that across credit 
unions as a whole. Identical one-tailed t-tests are conducted for acquiring credit unions. In 
this instance, one-tailed t-tests for equality of means (assuming unequal variances) reject the 
null hypothesis of equality at the .05 level for all variables in all years with the exception of 
NW and CL in 1992/93, RL, INV, IY and NIY in 1993/94 and PHY, NW, PL, CL and NIY in 
1994/95. When compared to credit unions as a whole, acquired credit unions have lower mean 
values across all balance sheet and profit and loss items, while acquiring credit unions 
generally have higher mean values, though some exceptions are noted.   
The next two explanatory variables in Table 1 relate to credit union profitability; namely, 
the ratio of net interest income to total loans (NIL) and the ratio of total expense to total 
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income (TEX). The second measure is particularly pertinent in that it indicates the operational 
risk of the institution, that is, the possibility that the costs of operating the institution will 
exceed its revenues, thereby depleting equity capital. A negative relationship is thought to 
exist between profitability and acquired credit unions and a positive relationship for acquiring 
credit unions.  
The sixth variable is a measure of liquidity, defined as the ratio of prime liquid assets to 
total assets (LIQ). Insufficient liquidity to meet demand for deposit withdrawals is identified 
as a key source of depository financial institution risk, and thereby the likelihood that merger 
activity will be used as a means of managing such risk. A negative (positive) coefficient is 
thought to exist ex ante for acquired (acquiring) institutions. Lastly, a variable indicating the 
total assets (AST) of each credit union (in logs) is also included. Abundant evidence already 
exists that a significant determinant of M&A activity in financial institutions is size. A 
positive (negative) coefficient is hypothesised for acquiring (acquired) credit unions.  
In addition to these performance-related variables, several qualitative variables relating to 
the associational bond under which each credit union exists are also included. All other things 
being equal, a community-based credit union (COM) will have a more diversified 
membership than an industrial-based one (IND). The usual implication is that the prospects 
for attaining an efficient scale of operations are higher for community-based credit unions. 
The ex ante sign on the dummy variable is thought to indicate that community-based credit 
unions have a higher probability of acquiring, while industrial-based credit unions (especially 
in vocational areas with a declining workforce) are thought more likely to be acquired. 
Finally, a dummy variable indicating whether the acquiring and acquired credit union have a 
common bond is included; that is, both the acquiring and acquired institution is either 
community or industrial-based (SME). It is important to note that regulatory pressures to 
maintain a homogeneous membership have been progressively relaxed and that similarity in 
the membership of acquired and acquiring credit unions is more likely to reflect 
management’s opinion on the compatibility of membership rather than any regulatory 
imperative. It is posited that mergers where compatible memberships exist are far more likely. 
A positive coefficient is postulated. 
3. Empirical results 
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In the previous section, we formulated models of the determinants of merger and 
acquisition activity in Australian credit unions over the period 1992/93 to 1994/95. Included 
among the other measures of firm performance in Table 1 are descriptive statistics of the 
DEA measures of pure technical and scale efficiency constructed on the basis of the inputs 
and outputs specified in Table 2. In general, it appears that the pure technical and scale 
efficiency of acquired and acquiring credit unions varies from the population of credit unions. 
For example, average pure technical efficiency (PTE) is generally higher in acquiring credit 
unions, whereas that for acquired credit unions is usually lower. In terms of pure technical 
efficiency in 1992/93 the average Australian credit union could – and solely on the basis of 
observable best-practice – become efficient by reducing inputs to 98.8 percent of their current 
level, while acquired and acquiring credit unions are 97.8 and 98.1 percent pure technically 
efficient respectively.  In comparable studies of Australian credit unions, Brown et al. (1999) 
and Worthington (1998) found technical efficiencies of 79 and 88 percent respectively. The 
measure of increasing returns-to-scale (IRS) for 1992/93 in Table 1 also indicates variation 
between acquired and acquiring credit unions with 84 percent of acquired credit unions 
operating at a smaller than optimal scale and only 35 percent of acquiring credit unions.  
However, while these results are broadly consistent with similar studies of credit unions 
and other thrifts, variance in sample and empirical methodology preclude valid comparison. 
In particular, an important feature of DEA is that as the number of inputs and outputs are 
increased, more and more individual credit unions serve to define the frontier, thereby 
increasing the average level of efficiency. For example, in an earlier study of Australian credit 
unions Worthington (1998) employed several alternative specifications with varying numbers 
of inputs and outputs. The indexes of pure technical efficiency in that study averaged 84 
percent with two outputs, 93 percent with three outputs and 98 percent with four outputs.  
The estimated coefficients for the multinomial logit regressions themselves are presented 
in Table 3. Also included in Table 3 are statistics for joint hypothesis and likelihood ratio 
tests. The results of a prediction success table based upon these estimates are found in Table 
4. With the multinomial logit formulation used, J - 1 sets of estimated coefficients are 
obtained, in this case for the acquiring and acquired credit unions. Credit unions that neither 
acquired nor were acquired provide the base or reference category. Thus, the estimated 
coefficients for acquiring and acquired credit unions are relative to credit unions that 
maintained the status quo, i.e. non-acquiring and non-acquired credit unions. Two separate 
models are estimated. The estimated coefficients and standard errors employing the entire set 
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of managerial and financial factors are shown in Table 3 columns 1 to 4. In order to refine the 
overall specification, LR tests were used to test the difference between the full model and a 
reduced model formed by omitting each effect in turn from the full model. The reduced model 
is presented in columns 5 to 8 of Table 3.  
Table 3 
Determinants of M&A status 
Variable Full model Reduced model 
 Acquiring credit unions Acquired credit unions Acquiring credit unions Acquired credit unions
 Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
CONS. 9.215 258.330 12.752 12.834 2.510 11.880 14.587 12.352
CAP 10.362 8.158 -0.127 4.658 11.696 7.782 -0.388 3.675
PRD -0.981 14.152 -13.224 8.747 3.206 13.608 -13.165 * 7.328
PTE 3.603** 1.840 15.416 12.499 3.435** 1.728 13.946 12.063
IRS 1.659 2.144 -0.141 0.608 1.609 1.954 -0.160 0.602
NIL 9.850* 5.261 8.573 7.428 10.863** 4.124 8.158 6.839
TEX 1.285 1.245 -0.002 0.498  
LIQ 1.983 3.947 -3.543* 1.947 1.201 3.788 -3.481 ** 1.597
AST 0.730*** 0.252 -0.598*** 0.148 0.729*** 0.245 -0.611 *** 0.143
COM -8.122 258.050 0.221 0.835  
IND -7.440 258.050 0.121 0.814  
SME 24.470*** 0.860 24.297*** 0.001 24.328*** 0.835 24.219 *** 0.000
Notes: CAP is the ratio of capital reserves to total assets; PRD is the ratio of the provision for doubtful debts 
to total loans; PTE is an index measure of pure technical efficiency; IRS is one if the credit union has 
increasing returns-to-scale and zero otherwise; NIL is the ratio of net interest income to total loans; TEX is 
the ratio of total expenses to total income; LIQ is the ratio of prime liquid assets to total assets; AST is the 
log of total assets; COM is one if the credit union is community-based and zero otherwise; IND is one if the 
credit is industrial-based and zero otherwise; SME is one if both the acquired and acquiring credit union are 
either community or industrial-based.  Asterisks indicate level of significance at the * – .10, ** – .05 and *** 
– .01 level. Log-likelihoods are 273.500 and 275.824 respectively. Restricted slopes log-likelihoods are 
677.886 and 677.886 respectively. Likelihood test statistics are 404.386 and 402.062 respectively. McFadden 
R2 is 0.597 and 0.593 respectively.   
The estimated models are highly significant, with likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis 
that all of the slope coefficients are zero rejected at the .01 level using the chi-square statistic. 
The results also appear sensible in terms of both the precision of the estimates and the signs 
on the coefficients. To detect possible sources of multicollinearity, ‘variance inflation factors’ 
(VIF)  are calculated using auxiliary regressions to obtain the R2 for each independent 
variable when regressed on the remaining independent variables. As a rule of thumb, if the 
VIF of an independent variable exceeds 10, multicollinearity may be a problem (Kennedy, 
1998). The highest VIFs are for AST (1.627), NIL (3.308) and TEX (3.404). These suggest that 
multicollinearity, while present, is not significant. 
To start with, in the case of the probability of a credit union acquiring another during the 
sample period, the coefficients relating to managerial ability (PTE), earnings (NIL), asset size 
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(ASS) and similarity in associational bond (SME) are significant and conform to the 
hypothesised sign. The results indicate that the larger (AST), more profitable (NIL) and more 
pure technically efficient (PTE) a credit union relative to the average credit union in the 
sample that maintains the status quo, the more likely it will acquire another credit union. 
Thompson (1997) likewise found that credit union size (by assets) was significant in 
determining takeover status in UK mutuals. These results are broadly comparable to the 
reduced model except that the levels of significance of the individual coefficients have 
generally increased.  
Turning to the acquired credit unions, the estimated coefficients in both the full and 
reduced model indicate that credit unions that are smaller in terms of the size of total assets 
(AST), have a lower level of liquidity (LIQ) and are of the same associational bond (SME) as 
the acquiring credit union are more likely to be acquired, relative to the average credit union 
that is neither acquired nor acquires another. The fact that pure technical efficiency, as a 
proxy for managerial ability, is insignificant, accords with Brown et al. (1999, p. 15) who 
concluded on the basis of univariate statistics that ‘exiting’ credit unions “…were as efficient 
as the industry as a whole but included a number of small credit unions”. The major 
difference between the full and reduced model for acquired credit unions is that the ratio of 
provision for doubtful debts expense to total loans (PRD) is significant and negative 
suggesting that credit unions with a highly risky asset portfolio are less likely to be acquired, 
relative to a credit union that maintains the status quo. These results have important 
implications for the Australian credit union industry, especially in regards to efficiency. For 
example, since acquiring credit unions have higher efficiency on average than the acquired, 
the industry should become more efficient as a whole through M&A activity. However, this is 
based on the assumption that the efficiency of the acquired credit union is raised to the level 
of the acquiring credit union.   
Finally, the ability of the full and reduced models to accurately predict M&A outcomes in 
credit unions is examined. Table 4 provides the predicted results for each different model. Of 
the forty acquiring credit unions in the sample, the full model predicted 24 cases (60.0%) 
correctly, and incorrectly identified 4 cases (10.0%) as acquired credit unions and 24 cases 
(30%) as neither acquiring nor acquired credit unions. In terms of acquired credit unions, the 
full model correctly predicted 22 cases (50.0%), and incorrectly identified 22 cases (50.0%) 
as either acquiring credit unions or neither acquired nor acquiring credit unions. Lastly, of the 
833 non-acquiring/acquired credit unions, the full model correctly identified all (100.0%) as 
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neither acquiring nor acquired credit unions.  Overall, the full specification correctly 
identified 879 cases (95.9%) in terms of the three possible M&A outcomes.  These results are 
broadly comparable to the number and percentage of correct predictions for the reduced 
model. The main difference is that the reduced model correctly identified slightly more cases 
as acquiring credit unions (62.5%) and slightly less as acquired credit unions (47.7%). The 
number and percentage correct of neither acquired nor acquiring credit unions was 
unchanged. 
Table 4 
Prediction success table 
 M&A status Observed Predicted  
   
Acquirin
g credit 
unions 
Acquired 
credit 
unions 
All other 
credit 
unions 
Percentage 
correct 
Acquiring credit unions 40 24 4 12 60.0 
Acquired credit unions 44 5 22 17 50.0 
All other credit unions 833 0 0 833 100.0 Full model 
Total credit unions 917 29 26 862 95.9 
Acquiring credit unions 40 25 3 12 62.5 
Acquired credit unions 44 6 21 17 47.7 
All other credit unions 833 0 0 833 100.0 
Reduced 
model 
Total credit unions 917 31 24 862 95.9 
These findings would initially suggest that either model might be more useful in 
identifying non-acquiring and non-acquired credit unions than credit unions engaging in 
M&A activity. However, the predicted outcomes of both models offer a substantial relative 
improvement when comparisons are made with a constant probability model. Observations in 
the constant probability results are classified using the predicted probability given by the 
sample proportion of acquired, acquiring and non-acquired/non-acquiring credit unions. 
These probabilities, which are constant across credit unions, are therefore values computed 
from estimating a model that includes only an intercept term. For instance, of the 917 cases 
shown in Table 4, 40 are acquiring credit unions, 44 are acquired credit unions and 833 are 
neither acquired nor acquiring credit unions. The absolute gain is the percentage change of 
correct predictions of the estimated models over the percentage of correct predictions in the 
constant probability model. The relative gain is the absolute gain as a percentage of the 
incorrect predictions in the constant probability model. These provide an additional measure 
of the predictive ability of the estimated models. 
For example, of the total 917 cases in the analysis, and using the sample proportions of 
cases, the constant probability model correctly predicts only 4.4 percent of acquiring cases, 
4.8 percent of acquired cases and 90.8 percent of all other cases and thus incorrectly predicts 
 19
95.6 percent of acquiring cases, 95.2 percent of acquired cases and 9.2 percent of all other 
cases. The full model alone thus represents a 55.6 percent absolute increase and a 58.1 
relative increase over the constant probability model for acquiring cases, a 45.2 percent 
absolute and 47.5 percent relative increase for acquired cases, and a 9.2 percent absolute and 
100.0 percent relative increase over all other cases.  This indicates that the models employed 
are very useful for predicting credit union M&A activity. Of course, these results are qualified 
in the sense that the ability of the model to categorise credit unions is conducted using in-
sample data, whereas out-of-sample data (if available) would provide a more accurate and 
less biased indicator of predictive ability.  
4. Concluding remarks  
The present study uses a multinomial logit model to investigate the influence of financial, 
managerial and regulatory factors on the probability of a credit union acquiring or being 
acquired during the period 1992/93 to 1994/95. The current paper extends empirical work in 
this area in at least two ways. First, and as far as the author is aware, it represents the first 
attempt to test these purported factors in the Australian institutional milieu. This is quite apart 
from the fact that very few studies have examined the M&A process of financial mutuals in 
general. Second, the paper incorporates nonparametric measures of pure technical and scale 
efficiency as factors in the M&A process. This allows a more thorough examination of the 
role of managerial ability and optimal scale size in M&A activity.   
The study has identified several significant influences on M&A activity in Australian 
credit unions. These include measures of financial performance, such as asset size, asset 
management and liquidity, and regulatory factors, including affinity of associational bond. 
The results also indicate that managerial ability, as proxied by nonparametric measures of 
pure technical efficiency, is an important influence on M&A in credit unions, at least as far as 
acquiring credit unions are concerned. This is a matter of some importance to regulators in 
Australia. The suggestion is that M&A activity could potentiality increase the efficiency of 
the industry as a whole assuming the efficiency of the acquired credit union is raised to that of 
the acquiring credit union. If this is the case, then regulators interested in industry wide 
efficiency gains could assist this process by, say, matching prospective acquiring (more 
efficient) credit unions with suitable (less efficient) acquisitions. Other possible policy 
changes by regulators could include the provision of advisory services to credit unions 
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regarding M&A procedure and assisting acquiring credit unions to quickly transfer more 
efficient practices to operations that have been acquired. The ability of these models to 
accurately predict M&A outcomes in credit unions was also examined. Of the acquiring credit 
unions in the sample, the full model predicted 60 percent of cases correctly, 50 percent of 
acquired cases correctly, and correctly identified all of the credit unions that neither acquired 
nor were acquired. This suggests that relatively parsimonious models can provide accurate 
predictions of M&A activity, at least in regards to financial mutuals.  
There are at least four ways in which this research may be extended. First, it would be 
useful to extend the methodology employed in the current study to measure post-merger 
efficiency. This would provide more direct evidence as to whether mergers are beneficial to 
the process of efficiency improvement in the banking system. A second extension would be to 
more rigorously define the extant posited determinants of M&A activity, and extend the set of 
explanatory variables within the confines of the available data. For example, the data 
collected by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) also contains 
information relating to the number of members, branches and agencies. These may serve to 
identify whether M&A are undertaken for the purpose of acquiring distribution networks 
and/or membership. Finally, similar techniques to the present study could be used to analyse 
the determinants of M&A activity in related industry sectors, such as building societies, life 
insurance companies and commercial banks. This may serve to highlight additional issues of 
concern to policy-makers and other interested parties. 
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